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I. INTRODUCTION
Maximi:ng return on research and development investmentfor the lfe science firm relies on
the continued effectiveness of the social contract between buyer and seller and institutional backing
of the underlying agreement. Intellectual property protection and institutional enforcement
structures commonly fail for firms conducting business in developing countries. Most
commentators claim that a strong intellectualpropery environment is essentialforprofitabiliy,
and we agree. But what do firms do in the short term when an effective social contract is not
possible? The authors argue that afirm can achieve success by first recognizng its status in the
social construct and then adopting tactics that do not depend on an effective social construct
between buyer and seller. Specificaly, the authors utilize an economic model of the agro-
biotechnology industry to demonstrate four responses for firms when operating within weak
intellectualproperty rights environments: dynamic pricing mechanisms, product bundlin& use
restriction technologies, and reduced investment.
"[1In the state of nature, Profit is the measure of Right."' Although profit
assuredly is the overarching objective of most firms, the state of nature in the
Hobbesian view-in which there is no common power, no law, and where
"Force[] and Fraud"2 are regarded as "Cardinall vertues" 3 -is anathema to the
efficient operation of the firm and its subsequent drive for profit maximization.
Accordingly, the firm, like society in general, seeks to avoid an otherwise "poore,
nasty, brutish and short"4 existence by entering into a social contract for
protection from this state of nature.
In return for these restrictions on its liberty,' the firm receives varied
protections' and, ideally, an institutionalized legal system to enforce these mutual
obligations. This social contract extends as well to the buyer-seller relationship.
Consumers receive various protections from predation by the firm and, in the
case of intellectual property rights, the firm can rely on the higher authority to
I THOMAs HOBBES, DE CIVE 48 (Howard Warrender ed., Clarendon Press 1983) (1651).
2 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 90 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1651).
3 Id.
4 Id. at 89. For example, Comment c to the Restatement 2d of Torts § 901 notes that
[o]riginally the primary purpose of the law of torts was to induce the injured
party and members of his family or clan to resort to the courts for relief, rather
than taking the law into their own hands by attempting to wreak vengeance on
the wrongdoer or by resorting to violent means of self-help.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. c (1979).
5 An example of restrictions of a firm's liberty would be profit maximization without regard
to the rights of others.
6 Rules restricting unfair competition would serve as an example of a protection received by
the firm.
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punish consumers attempting to breach the social contract by duplication or
unauthorized use of protected property.
Once removed from this "state of nature," the firm can develop a strategic
plan to maximize its profits-in the case of the life science industry, most
critically, its return on investment for biotechnology research and development.
This plan, however, relies on the continued effectiveness of the social contract.
When this social contract fails, the firm must respond in a manner consistent with
its profit maximization strategy. This Article examines the breakdown in
intellectual property protection and institutional enforcement structures within
the context of agricultural production, specifically the profit maximization options
available to United States-based agro-biotechnology firms operating in the
relatively weak intellectual property and institutional environments of South
America. In order to explore the effectiveness of the various economic,
technological, and legal strategies available to protect private intellectual property
and maximize return on investment, this Article formalizes the seed company's
problem and relies upon economic simulation to analyze possible strategies.
While most commentators claim that a strong intellectual property environment
is essential for profitability in the agro-biotechnology industry,7 this Article
postulates that an agro-biotechnology company can achieve profitability in weak
institutional environments if it adopts a dynamic pricing strategy as a next best
' Debra L. Blair, Intellectual Property Protection and its Impact on the U.S. Seed Indusry, 4 DRAKEJ.
AGRIC. L. 297, 330-31 (1999) (discussing the value of intellectual property to seed development
firms); Jim Chen, The Parable of the Seeds: Interpreting the Plant Varie Protection Act in Furtherance of
Innovation Polg, 81 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 105, 157 (2005) (noting the failure of the Plant Variety
Protection Act to protect firm investments and spur further innovation because of the statute's
limited scope of protection); Mark D. Janis & Jay P. Kesan, U.S. Plant Variety Protection: Sound and
Fury... ?, 39 Hous. L. REv. 727,777 (2002) (suggesting proponents of stronger intellectual property
protection for plants should focus on reforming the relatively stronger utility patent system); Jay P.
Kesan, Intellectual Property Protection andAgriculturalBiotechnolog: A Mu/tidisdpnay Perspective, 44 AM.
BEHAV. Sci. 464, 471 (2000) (noting that it is "critical to fashion IP regimes that adequately reward
the inventor for his or her efforts and provide enough economic stability to promote investment in
the inventive endeavors");Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Property Rights and Incentives to Invest in Seed
Varieties: Governmental Regulations in Aentina, 8 AGBIoFORUM 118, 125 (2005), availabk at http://
www.agbioforum.org/v8n23/v8n23a08-kesan.pdf (concluding that property rights regimes are
important for agricultural research and development, and that self-pollinating seeds such as soybeans
need patent protection); Lawrence Kent, Intellectual Property Problems and Other Obstacles to
Sharing the Benefits of Crop Biotechnology with Developing Countries, Presentation at Seeds of
Change: Intellectual Property Protection for Agricultural Biotechnology (Apr. 8-10, 2004) (on file
with authors).
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strategy rather than following traditional monopolistic pricing' that may be most
appropriate under relatively strong institutional environments.
A dynamic price strategy, as outlined below, allows the firm with innovative
products to enter a market immediately, while continuing conventional long-term
approaches such as lobbying for stronger intellectual property rights. Moreover,
even after imposition of robust intellectual property rules, firms must wait for the
evolution of social norms that respect these rights, often through the instillation
of discipline within a legal enforcement system, before taking full advantage of the
monopolistic position provided by the underlying intellectual property right.
Because most high technology firms, however, operate on relatively short-term
business plans of three to five years, the innovative firm faces an immediate need
for a workable strategy such as dynamic pricing, especially during periods of rapid
growth, as opposed to relying on development of new legal structures.
For example, the soybean production area in Argentina nearly doubled from
6 to 11 million hectares in a five-year period.9 Agro-biotechnology firms could
focus their efforts on lobbying activities for improved intellectual property
protection before entering the market, but in the interim, they would miss the
opportunity to capture market share and substantial revenue. On the other hand,
firms could enter the market using the traditional business model based on the
social contract in place in North America. Subsequent complaints of "theft" of
their intellectual property, however, most likely would fall upon deaf ears in the
local environment. Therefore, an alternative strategy that incorporates and
accounts for the heterogeneous social contracts and business opportunities under
which an agro-biotechnology company must operate in the global agricultural
marketplace is an important development.
Although the context of this Article is agricultural production, the strategic
decisions faced by the firm operating in an international environment with
variable institutional settings and serving customers bounded by norms that fail
to coincide with the firm's ideal social contract is directly analogous to other
industries with products capable of easy consumer duplication, such as music and
8 Under pure monopoly pricing, the first firm is able to maximize profitability as there is no
competition. An inferior state for the firm occurs with monopolistic competition whereby a firm's
pricing power is constrained by other competitors. The degree of competition is central to the
arguments advocated in this Article. The greater number of available substitutes the more limited
the price setting ability of the firm. HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIc ANALYsIs 92-93 (2d ed.
1984).
9 Peter D. Goldsmith et al., IntellectualProperny Piray in a North-South Context: EmpiricalEidence,
35 AGRIC. EcON. 335, 341 (2006). In contrast, the rate of growth in acres planted in soybeans in
the United States was only 5. 6 % over the same time period. http://www.nass.usda.gov/Data.and
_Statistics/QuickStats/index.asp (calculated by the authors using the Quick Stats Database
compiled by the National Agricultural Statistics Service; database on file with the authors).
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software.'0 Accordingly, the economic model, consequences, and possible
alternative strategic decisions developed below, such as dynamic pricing
mechanisms, product bundling, use restriction technologies, and reduced
investment, are relevant to the strategic decisions faced in a wide array of
industries.
Part II of this Article provides background on genetic engineering and
production of agricultural commodity crops. Particular attention is paid to the
structural changes resulting from the advent of genetic engineering technologies
in the commodity-based food and feed supply chains. Part II describes the legal
environment for intellectual property rights in plants and the efficacy of court
systems to enforce these rights. The United States, considered one of the
friendliest legal environments for biotechnology inventors," is used as a baseline
for comparison with the relatively weak legal systems found in some southern
hemisphere nations. Part III of this Article employs a dynamic gaming model
under asymmetric information to demonstrate how seed development companies
and farmers will behave under complete and perfect information in an effective
legal system.
The global agricultural marketplace (like many international markets), however,
is far from homogeneous. Firms, therefore, must have multifaceted approaches
to managing their intellectual property. High potential growth markets are often
characterized by weak institutional environments, with varying risk preferences
among market actors and asymmetric information. In this Article simulation is
U--to reduce the complexity of the strategic alternatives available for firms
seeking recovery of research and development expenses. This Article, concludes
with a discussion of how to apply the simulation results to aid policymakers
seeking to balance the needs of farmers with the underlying necessity of
innovation. Dynamic pricing, product bundling, use restriction technology, and
reduced investment are offered as possible second-best alternatives to maximize
firm profit in weak institutional environments.
10 See Dan L. Burk, DNA Rules: Legal and Conceptual Impkcations of Biological 'Lack-Out" Systems,
92 CAL. L. REv. 1553, 1556 (2004) (comparing reproducible plants to other areas of innovation such
as books and music); Chen, supra note 7, at 128 (comparing seed saving to copyright law's "first sale"
doctrine); Peter D. Goldsmith, Innovation, Suppy Chain Control, and the Wefare ofFarmers: The Economics
ofGeneticaly ModifiedSeeds, 44 AM. BEHAV. SC. 1302, 1317-19 (2001) (discussing product durability
as "the bane of the monopolist," especially in the life science industry).
n Kesan & Gallo, supra note 7, at 119.
[Vol. 14:237
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II. GENETIC ENGINEERING AND AGRICULTURE: THE SECOND
"GREEN" REVOLUTION?
Advancements in genetic engineering technologies 12 in the last decade have
transformed post-modern agriculture at a rate faster than even the widely-hailed
chemical and fertilizer bonanza of the first "Green Revolution."' 3 Farmers in
2005, as in each year since the commercial introduction of genetically engineered
plants in 1996, converted from conventionally bred seed to genetically engineered
varieties at a double-digit rate.'4 In total, the global biotech crop area has
increased more than fifty-fold within this first decade of commercialization. 5
12 "Genetic engineering technologies" refers to the creation of new varieties of animals, plants,
and microorganisms "in which the genetic material has been altered in a way that does not occur
naturally by mating and/or natural recombination." Council Directive 2001/18, art. 2(2), 2001 O.J.
(L 106) 1 (EC). The EU Directive, probably the most commonly accepted definition of genetic
engineering, further defines genetic modification as using the techniques of
(1) recombinant nucleic acid techniques involving the formation of new
combinations of genetic material by the insertion of nucleic acid molecules
produced by whatever means outside an organism, into any virus, bacterial
plasmid or other vector system and their incorporation into a host organism in
which they do not naturally occur but in which they are capable of continued
propagation; (2) techniques involving the direct introduction into an organism
of heritable material prepared outside the organism including micro-injection,
macro-injection and micro-encapsulation; [or] (3) cell fusion (including
protoplast fusion) or hybridisation techniques where live cells with new
combinations of heritable genetic material are formed through the fusion of
two or more cells by means of methods that do not occur naturally.
Id. at Annex I.A., pt. 1.
13 See CLIVE JAMES, INTERNATIONAL SERVICE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH
APPLICATIONS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, BRIEF 34, GLOBAL STATUS OF COMMERCIALIZED
BIOTECH/GM CROPS: 2005 iii (International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech
Applications) (2005), availabk at http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publicatidons/briefs/34/download/
isaaa-brief-34-2005.pdf; see also Patricia R. McCoy, BiotechAdoption Most RapidEvent inAg, CAP. PRESS
AGRIC. WKLY., Jan. 27, 2006, http://www.capitalpress.info/main.asp?SectionID=67&SubSection
ID=792&ArticlelD=22611. For a contemporary definition and summary of the first "Green
Revolution" and the contributions of Norman Bourlag, see Wikipedia, Green Revolution,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wili/Greenrevolution (last visited Apr. 7,2007). The purported benefits
of this revolution, however, are also subject to criticism. See Debbie Collier, Access to and Control over
Plant Genetic Resoures for Food and Agriculture in South and Southern Africa: How Many Wrongs Before a
Right?, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 529, 535--36 (2006) (detailing detrimental effects of the Green
Revolution on many African communities).
14 JAMES, supra note 13, at 3, 4.
"5 Id. at 3. The global value of biotech crops in 2005 was $5.25 billion, representing 15% of the
commercial seed market. Id at 7.
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As in any system, physical or social, technological advances have the potential
to disrupt settled practices.' 6 Application of genetic engineering technologies to
the agricultural production system is no different.'" Several commentators have
noted disruptions to land use practices," the influx of written contracts into long-
standing informal buyer-seller relationships," international trade restrictions, and
the concerns of upstream participants in the supply chain,2' including
consumers. 22 Despite these drawbacks, many American farmers have welcomed
agricultural biotechnology with open arms. United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) planting statistics from 2006 estimate that 89% of soybean
16 Kim Solez & Sheila Moriber Katz, Cybermedine: Mainstream Medicine bj 2020/Crossing
Boundaries, 19 J. MARSHALLJ. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 557, 561 (2001) (noting the disruptive power
of many modem technologies along with cybermedicine, such as "the computer disk drive, discount
retailing and home centers, tabletop. photocopiers, mini mill steel technology, and hydraulic
excavation machines (power diggers)").
17 R. James Cook, Biotechnolog: Cause and Consequence of Change in Agriculture, in
BIOTECHNOLOGY: SCIENCEAND SOCIETYAT A CROSSROAD 39,40-41 (Allan Eaglesharn et al. eds.,
2003) (describing agriculture as a system and biotechnology as one of several innovations to the
industry).
" A. Bryan Endres, '"MO ": Genetical# Mo&fied Organism or Gigantic Monetary Ob'gation? The
Liabiho Schemes for GMO Damage in the United States and the European Union, 22 Loy. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 453, 488-94 (2000) (discussing strict liability and nuisance); Margaret Rosso
Grossman. Binte.bo _Property Rjghts and the En,irnn, 5,, 0 qf AM . CnMP T 91 . 9L.25, 231-36 (..
2002) (discussing common law nuisance and trespass aspects of biotechnology).
19 Lawrence Busch, Lessons Unlearned: How Biotechnology is Changing Socieo, in BIOTECHNOLOGY:
SCIENCE AND SOCIETY AT A CROSSROAD 27, 31 (Allan Eaglesham et al. eds., 2003) (noting the
introduction of complex contracts to seed sales); A. Bryan Endres, Coexistence Strategies in a Biotech
Word. Exploring Statutoy Grower Protections, 13 Mo. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 206, 209 n. 11 (2006)
(discussing liability exposure from contractual agreements); Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 1313
(discussing effect of premiums and technology fees on farmers).
2o Thomas P. Redick & MichaelJ. Adrian, Do European Union Non-TariffBarriers Create Economic
Nuisances in the United States?, 1 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 87, 102-08, 116-24 (2005) (describing
consequences of coexistence and traceability measures in the European Union on the international
shipment of commodity crops); A. Bryan Endres, Risk Management StrategiesforIdentioy Preserved Grain
Exports, 15 AGRIC. L. (Ill. St. Bar Ass'n) Sept. 2005, at 1.
21 Busch, supra note 19, at 32 (describing reactions of Frito-Lay and McDonald's to the
introduction of genetically engineered food). See also Genetic Engineering: Major Companies Reject GM-
Food, EUR. AGRI, June 4, 1999, available at 1999 WLNR 4604597 (noting GMO-free policy of
European food producers Nestle and Unilever); Nicholas Kalatzandonakes et al., Global Identiy
Preservation Costs in Agricultural Suppy Chains, 49 CAN. J. AGRIC. ECON. 605, 605 (2001) (noting
intensified growth in identity preservation programs to avoid genetically engineered foods).
' Busch, supra note 19, at 33 (describing reactions of consumers); EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
RISKISSUES: SPECIALEUROBAROMETER238, at 24 (2006), availableathttp://www.eFSA.EUROPA.
eu/etc/medialib/efsa/about-efsa/communicating
-
risk/risk-perception/339.par.001.fsle.dat/c
ommreporteurobarometerLen2.pdf (finding 62% of Europeans either "very worried" or "fairly
worried" "about genetically modified products in food or drinks').
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acres,23 61% of corn acres, 24 and 83% of cotton acres 25 were planted with varieties
derived through genetic engineering. An analysis of why so many farmers have
embraced this technology is beyond the scope of this article, but a quick review
of the literature identifies, at least with respect to soybeans, a single predominate
reason-reduced management costs that enable the farmer to manage ever larger
fields without the necessity of hiring and supervising additional workers.26
In addition to reduced on-farm management costs, adoption of agricultural
biotechnology has changed the nature of farmer interactions with other elements
of the supply chain, perhaps none more important than relationships with farm
input suppliers. 27 Throughout history, farmers planted, harvested, saved, and
23 USDA/ERS,Adoption of Genetically Engineered Crops in the U.S.: Soybeans, http://www.
ers.usda.gov/Data/BiotechCrops/ExtentofAdoptionTable3.htm.
24 USDA/ERS, Adoption of Genetically Engineered Crops in the U.S.: Corn varieties, http://
www.ers.usda.gov/Data/BiotechCrops/ExtentofAdoptionTablel .htm.
21 USDA/ERS, Adoption of Genetically Engineered Crops in the U.S.: Cotton Varieties,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/BiotechCrops/ExtentofAdoptionTable2.htm.
26 See Claudio Soregaroli & Justus Wesseler, Minimum Distance Requirements and liability:
Impcationsfor Co-E%istence, in ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS AND BENEFITS OFTRANSGENIC CROPS 165,
166 (J.H.H. Wesseler ed., 2005) (finding flexibility in growing practices, which reduces the time
specificity of labor and capital, as an important factor in farmers selecting genetically engineered
crops and noting no particular profitability impacts from yield or cost savings); David S. Bullock &
Elisavet I. Nitsi, Roundup Ready Soybean Technology and Farm Production Costs: Measuring the Incentive to
Adopt GeneicalyModifedSeeds, 44 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 1283,1298 (2001) (finding that "much of the cost
savings from adopting Roundup Ready technology must come from saving management costs and
avoiding risk" as "farmers need to put in much less time and effort scouting for and identifying
weeds and figuring out how to spray them"). A simple example of this transformation is the demise
of the "bean buggy." The bean buggy, to the extent it is still used, is a tractor pulling a tank of
herbicides driven by the farmer with a row of seats on the front bumper occupied by teenagers on
summer vacation holding spray guns. Interview with J.M. Endres in Hurley, S.D. (July 25, 2006).
The job of the teenagers is to precisely aim the spray at weeds in the bean field without any residue
touching the bean plant. Id. The farmer, meanwhile, drove the tractor and supervised the spraying
activity. Id. The adoption of Roundup Ready® soybeans in almost 90% of soybean acres, see supra
note 23, has eliminated, in large part, the need for the bean buggy and precise spraying techniques
(not to mention the elimination of the rural equivalent of the summer lifeguard job-sitting on a seat
in a bathing suit getting a tan while pretending to pay attention). Roundup Ready® soybeans are
tolerant to the herbicide and a "blanket" herbicide application may be made over the field
(sometimes even via aerial spraying), thereby saving the farmer valuable management time. Janet
Carpenter & Leonard Gianessi, Herbicide Tolerant Soybeans: Why Growers Are Adopting Roundup Ready
Varieties, 2 AGBIOFORUM 65, 65 (1999), available at http://www.agbioforum.org/v2n2/v2n2a02-
carpenter.pdf.
21 See A. Bryan Endres, State Authorized Seed Saving: Poltical Pressures and Constitutional Restraints,
9 DRAKEJ. AGRIC. L. 323, 335-41 (2004) (discussing changes in the relationship between farmers
and input suppliers precipitated by imposition of limited license agreements and state political
responses).
9
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replanted seed from season to season.28 Farmers also received free seed from the
USDA.29 In the late-1800s, farmers gradually began to purchase seed from
commercial seed suppliers and, in 1924, the USDA ceased its free distribution of
seeds.3" Most seed businesses at the time were small and had a primary role in the
multiplication of seed varieties developed in the public domain by land grant
institutions and public breeding projects.31 Limited financial resources32 and the
inability to preclude competitors from immediately appropriating new varieties as
their own constrained basic research and development in the private sector. As
a result, the seed business was a monopolistic competitive market with
differentiation based on unique and local varietal characteristics of adaptability
and performance.
33
The genetic engineering revolution precipitated a structural change within the
seed industry. An industry formerly characterized by local firms, which utilized
publicly developed varieties and provided modest product differentiation, was
replaced, in part, by multi-national life science firms engaging in proprietary
research activities, offering distinct products with transgenic properties.
34
Accompanying this structural shift was a change in research and development
expenditures from public to private sources35 with almost all commercialization
of genetically engineered seeds completed by private firms.36 In a private sector
28 f" llipr rv~ra ,,nte 1 r,'17 (,tn, - , ,, - h-t,,en t,-;,-,  oA 7,,-lr-1 -1 .. ,-rh
-- - - - --- 
_ -I- - __
institutions and saving of seeds for exchange, sale, and cultivation); Endres, supra note 27, at 324.
29 Keith Aoki, Feeds, Seeds & Deeds: Recent Skirmishes in the Seed Wars, 11 CARDOZOJ. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 247, 264-66 (2003).
o See Endres, supra note 27, at 327-28 (describing formation of the American Seed Trade
Association and lobbying efforts to end the government's free distribution of seed). See also 7 U.S.C.
§ 2201 (2000) (stating the mission of the USDA is in part "to procure, propagate, and distribute
among the people new and valuable seeds and plants").
31 JORGE FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO, THE SEED INDUSTRY IN U.S. AGRICULTURE: AN
EXPLORATION OF DATA AND INFORMATION ON CROP SEED MARKETS, REGULATION, INDUSTRY
STRUCTURE, AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 25 (USDA Econ. Res. Serv., Agric. Info. Bulletin
No. 786, 2004).
32 See NEIL MCMULLEN, SEEDS AND WORLD AGRICULTURAL PROGRESS 210 (1987); Donald
N. Duvick, The United States, in MAIZE SEED INDUSTRIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 193, 200
(Michael L. Morris ed., 1998).
3' Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 1303.
34 BIOTECH 2005 LIFE SCIENCES: A MOVE TOwARD PREDICTABILITY 259, 263-69 (Stephen
Burrill ed., 2005) [hereinafter BIOTECH 2005] (noting seed industry consolidation as the two largest
players positioning themselves to dominate the market and decline of the small, "Agbio" company).
" FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO, supra note 31, at 41-47 (discussing shifting roles of public and
private sector research and development).
' Carl E. Pray & Anwar Naseem, Biotechnogy R&D: Pohy Options to Ensure Access and Benofts
for the Poor (ESA Working Paper No. 03-08 2003), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/007/
ae04le/ae041e00.pdf.
[Vol. 14:237
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theoretically responsive to the demands of shareholders, development of new,
genetically engineered seed varieties is a high-risk enterprise, requiring up to ten
years and $300 million in up-front developmental costs. 3 7 How to recapture these
massive research and development expenditures, 3 obviously, is of central concern
to the new breed of seed suppliers.
Intellectual property protections, in the form of trade secrets, plant variety
protection certificates, and utility patents, prevent competitors from adopting
these innovations and gaining market share.39 The farmer, however, has
historically operated under a different social construct, unconstrained by formal
intellectual property rights. In many circles, saving seed from year to year is
regarded as a traditional right of farmers.' This leakage to the firm's return on
investment caused by seed saving is particularly acute for self-pollinating, high
yield crops such as soybeans and cotton.4 Other cultivars, such as hybrid corn,
provide a natural method of protecting agro-biotechnology firms' investments
because saved hybrid seed lacks vigor and produces substantially lower yields,
thereby forcing farmers to purchase new seed each growing season.4"
The resulting tension between the input supplier (seed developer) and the
farmer seeking to minimize costs by saving seed is the essence of this article. Life
science firms invest tremendous amounts of money in developing new genetically
engineered seed varieties43 and must recover these costs through profitable
"7 Rick Weiss, Farmers Fearl-oss ofFreedom, Monsanto SeedPoli-y Threatens Land Rights, CAP. TIMES
(Madison, WI), Feb. 4, 1999, at 1B, available at 1999 WLNR 2494275.
" Monsanto Company, the developer of more than 90% of the seeds planted worldwide of
herbicide-tolerant or insect-tolerant crops, estimated research and development expenditures at $1.5
million/day on seeds and biotech, and no longer invests in new chemicals. BIOTECH 2005, supra
note 34, at 259. In contrast, many of the developments of the Green Revolution arose from public
breeding programs carried out by land grant institutions with a statutory mandate to share these
discovering with the farming population. See JACK RALPH KLOPPENBURG,JR., FIRST THE SEED:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY 12-14 (2d ed. 2004)
9 See infra Part III for a thorough discussion of intellectual property regimes.
o See Endres, supra note 27, at 326-27 (noting historical seed saving practices and government
encouragement of the same). Congress codified this tradition in the Plant Variety Protection Act,
7 U.S.C. § 2543 (2000).
41 Self-pollinating plant varieties, such as soybeans, cotton, and wheat, reproduce true-to-type
and can be saved from one crop harvest and planted the next without significant losses in yield or
plant vigor. FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO, supra note 31, at 18.
42 See id. at 20 (noting diminished yields of second generation hybrid seed);Jim Waltrip, Seminis
Seeds, Hybridization: A Phenomenon that Feeds Us Well, available athttp://www.humeseeds.com/
hybrdlvr.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2007) (discussing the negative effect of using second-generation
hybrid crops).
"' See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing extent of private research and
development costs). See aisoJorge Fernandez-Cornejo & David Schimmelpfennig, Have SeedIndusty
Changes Affected Research Effort, AMBER WAVES, Feb. 2004, at 14, 16 (detailing increase in private
11
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commercialization. Intellectual property laws, often supplemented by limited
license purchase agreements, provide one model for cost recovery vis-i-vis the
farmer. The reality, however, is that many nations lack institutional controls, such
as robust intellectual property laws and effective court systems to enforce
intangible property rights and contractual arrangements.' Accordingly, farmers
operating in regions without institutional controls have a greater economic
incentive to disregard intellectual property rights and contractual restrictions and
save their seed to reduce production costs. Moreover, the areas of potential
growth for input suppliers tend to be not in the established farm belts of North
America, but in southern regions, such as Argentina and Brazil, or eastern areas,
such as China, where respect for private intellectual property rights historically
lacks institutional support.
In an increasingly global market for commodity agricultural products, farmers
in the United States must compete for markets not only among themselves, but
also with producers globally.45 The implication with respect to intellectual
property is that, absent a level playing field, foreign producers have lower costs
of production because farmers in the United States incur the research and
development costs for improved plant varieties. Foreign farmers free-ride on
technical innovations and increase the world supply of the commodity, which
lowers the price for all producers.
A similar situation occurs in the development and distribution of therapeutic
drugs. The United States serves as the profit center for pharmaceuticals while
Lustnuuu to other natons is eifaer at a loss or on a break-even basis."
sector spending from $2.0 billion in 1970 to $4.2 billion in 1996 while public sector spending
remained relatively flat).
44 See ANDREA YANKELEVICH, USDA FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE, GAIN REPORT No.
AR5033,ARGENTINA BIOTECHNOLOGYANNUAL 2005, at 9 (concluding that "judicial enforcement
procedures in Argentina... are ineffective as a mechanism to prevent the unauthorized commercial
use of protected varieties").
45 RANDALL D. SCHNEPF ET AL., USDA, AGRICULTURE & TRADE REP. WRS-01-3,
AGRICULTURE IN BRAzIL AND ARGENTINA: DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS FOR MAJOR FIELD
CROPS 53 (2001), availabkathttp://usda.mannlib.comell.edu/reports/erssor/international/wrs-bb/
2001 /wrs0l 3/pdf (finding "the United States lags slightly behind Argentina and Brazil in soybean
export cost competitiveness'); Stu Ellis, The Soybean Tango, Starring the Peso, the Real, and the
Dollar, http://www.farmgate.uiuc.edu/archive/2006/ 02/post.8.html (2006) (describing the change
in soybean marketing accompanying the increasing production in South America and the impact of
exchange rates on the prices farmers receive in the United States).
' Compared to consumers in other nations, new drugs are disproportionately costly to the
American consumer as the American free market system ensures that pharmaceutical firms can
recoup research and development costs by charging as much as the market will bear, maximizing
profits. In contrast, other industrialized nations use a variety of direct and indirect price-control
mechanisms to reduce the cost to consumers by 35% to 55%. Eduardo Porter, Importing Less
Expensive Drugs Not Seen as Cure for U.S. Woes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2004, at 1. As a result,
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Although U.S. citizens are quick to complain about high drug prices, they are at
least not in direct competition with those able to purchase pharmaceuticals at a
lower cost. In the agricultural context, however, there is a different paradigm.
The low cost, third-country seed purchaser/farmer is in direct competition in the
international commodity market with the high cost, domestic seed
purchaser/farmer. The price differential places the domestic farmer, ceterisparibus,
at a disadvantage with respect to total production costs and even has led some
prominent farm organizations to demand lowering domestic intellectual property
standards to level the playing field.47
Other alternatives include pressuring nations to elevate intellectual property
standards and institutional structures to the level found in the United States4" or
consumers in the United States shoulder a disproportionate share of the expense for new drug
development. Mark B. McClellan, Commissioner, FDA, Remarks at the First International
Colloquium on Generic Medicine (Sept. 25, 2003), available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/speeches/
2003/genericdrug0925.html. The manufacturing and other short-run costs of producing a new drug
accounts for only a fraction of the total drug development expense, estimated at approximately 30%.
SeeJOHN E. CALFEE ET AL., AN EXPLORATORY ANALYsIS OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE DISPARITIES
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS AMONG Six DEVELOPED NATIONs 5 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for
Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 06-07, 2006), available at http://www.aei-brookings.org/
admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=1265. Once research and development costs have been recovered
in the United States by pricing new drugs according to market demand, the pharmaceutical
company's cost of production is reduced to manufacturing and short-run costs and the drug may
be sold for a profit even in countries with stringent price controls. Id. at 1-3. These data suggest
that price controls in other nations effectively shift the financial burden of new drug development
to the United States with a corresponding reduction in the pharmaceutical industry's reliance on
other markets for recovery of development costs. Id.
4 Specifically, the Illinois Farm Bureau, a steadfast proponent of strong property rights, has
called for Congress to amend the Plant Variety Protection Act to supersede utility patent protection
for plants and provide for the saving of seeds from year to year for on-farm use. Repps Hudson,
Inois Farmers Want to be Able to Keep Some Patented Seeds, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 7, 2005,
at BI; see also Ill. Farm Bureau, 2006 Position Statements: Plant Patents and Plant Variety Protection,
http://www.ilfb.org/uploads/adhoc/policies/policies2005/072/htm (supporting the Plant Variety
Protection Act as the exclusive statute governing intellectual property rights for plant varieties).
" See Andres A. Gallo & Jay P. Kesan, Property Rights Legislation inAgriculturalBiotebnolog: United
States and Argentina, 7 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 565, 584 (2006) (describing political pressure to
strengthen intellectual property laws); The International Association of Plant Breeders for the
Protection of Plant Varieties (ASSINSEL), Position Paper on Farm Saved Seed, http://www.
worldseed.org/Position-papers/FSSe.htm (advocating strong intellectual property protection and
limits to farm saved seed); U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Intellectual Property Rights, http://
www.uschamber.com/issues/index/international/ipr.htm (describing failure of many U.S. trading
partners to provide adequate intellectual property protection). See also Susan K. Sell, Industry Strategies
for Intellectual Propertj and Trade: The Questfor TRIPS and Post-TRIPS Strategies, 10 CARDOZO J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 79, 83-85 (2002) (describing industry lobbying ("private sector activism") of foreign
governments to increase intellectual property protection in a variety of industries). Gallo & Kesan,
supra, at 596, also describe a third strategy-the imposition of a tax on farmers-rather than patent
13
Endres and Goldsmith: Alternative Business Strategies in Weak Intellectual Property Env
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2007
J. INTELL PROP. L[l
developing within the plant's genome barriers to duplication similar to those in
hybrid corn. 9 In the interim, faced with rising input costs and steady-to-declining
output revenues s° some domestic farmers may choose to violate intellectual
property rights and/or contract obligations and save seed for on-farm use.
Accordingly, the implications to the domestic seed-producing firm operating in
foreign regions with lower intellectual property and enforcement standards may
have spillover effects on customer relations in their home country. On the other
hand, the agro-biotechnology firm can engage in a variety of strategic actions to
curb seed saving and capture revenue. Before proceeding to the economic model
and a discussion of the firm's responses in Part IV, an evaluation of institutional
standards is helpful to provide context.
III. A NORTH-SOUTH COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF THE LEGAL
ENVIRONMENT FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION FOR PLANTS
Although the domestic legal environment for intellectual property protection
for plants is well documented,5' a brief summary is warranted for contextual
royalty fees, that would be distributed to seed producers as compensation for inadequacies in the
intellectual property enforcement system.
'9 Perhaps the most discussed development in this field is the genetic use restriction technology
knwna~cimnrotcrnfl~y CC .&,SQ afll sc,"-:.r~ I~ ;_ .. "1 , CCUUW I r ,wa'ln mi r-fls
or a Threat to the Patent System?, 45 IDEA 477, 478-81 (2005);Jeremy P. Oczek, In tbe-Aftermatb of the
'Ferminator" Technology Controverry: Intellectual Property Protections for Geneticaly Engineered Seeds and the
Rigbt to Save and Replant Seed, 41 B.C. L. REv. 627, 647 (2000); Samantha M. Ohlgart, The Terminator
Gene: Intellectual Property RIgbts vs. The Farmers' Common Law R'gbt to Save Seed, 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L.
473, 474 (2002); Haley Stein, Intellectual Property and Geneticaly Modified Seeds: The United States, Trade,
and the Developing World, 3 Nw.J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 160, 168 (2005); Bamaby J. Feder, Plant
Sterility Researcb Inflames Debate on Biotechnologv's Role in Farming, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1999, at A18.
In 1998, Delta & Pine Land & Company and the USDA jointly secured a patent on a method of
genetically engineering plants to ensure that second generation seeds are sterile. U.S. Patent No.
5,723,765, claim 10 (filed Mar. 3, 1998) ("A method for producing seed that is incapable of
germination. . . 2). Monsanto Co. subsequently acquired the patent rights, but has yet to
commercialize the technology due, in part, to significant public opposition. Stephanie Strom,
Rockefeller Foundation Head to Quit, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 9, 2003, at A22 (describing the Rockefeller
Foundation's opposition to Monsanto's plan to commercialize terminator technology due to
concerns regarding the impact on farmers in the developing world). Other patents with similar
technology have since been issued to fellow agro-biotech company AstraZeneca, see U.S. Patent No.
5,808,034 (filed Sept. 15,1998) (Plant Gene Construct Comprising Male Flower Specific Promoters),
and others, see Muscati, supra, at 479, n.10 (listing patent numbers).
o See Frederick Kirschenmann, Technologiesfor a Sustainable Future: Therapeutic Intervention Versus
Restructuring the System, in BIOTECHNOLOGY: SCIENCE AND SOCIETYAT A CROSSROADS 73,82 (Allan
Eaglesham et al. eds., 2003) (noting "that whilegross farm income grew dramatically since 1960, net
farm income remained essentially fiat...").
5" See, e.g., Blair, spra note 7, at 315-19 (discussing utility patent intellectual property protection
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purposes and to set a baseline for comparison of the U.S. system with other
institutional systems such as that in Argentina. The analysis incorporates the
availability of common law and statutory forms of intellectual property applicable
to plants, as well as the efficacy of the respective judiciary to enforce these rights
and ancillary contract rights.
A. PLANT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: A
HISTORICAL SUMMARY
Statutory-based intellectual property protection for plants, when viewed in the
historical context of plant breeding, is a relatively new concept.5 2 Early farmers
selected, saved, and traded with their neighbors unique seeds created as a result
of chance mutations and selective breeding." Although seeds were considered
chattel and subject to personal property rules, the underlying genetics remained
within the public domain.14 Beginning in the 1840s, the Patent and Trademark
Office's (PTO) Division of Agriculture distributed seeds to the nation's farmers
for free. 5 The USDA later assumed the PTO's outreach responsibilities and
distributed novel seed varieties developed at land grant colleges and agricultural
experiment stations.5 6 After years of lobbying by the commercial seed industry,
Congress ceased the free seed distribution program in 1924."
In 1930, Congress passed the first suigeneris intellectual property scheme for
plants, the Plant Patent Act of 1930 (PPA). The PPA provided a plant patent for
novel, asexually reproduced varieties-protection for the nursery, rather than the
commercial grain and oilseed industry. Seed saving and "brown bagging""
remained a legal and common practice among farmers.5 9 Forty years later,
Congress enacted an intellectual property regime for varieties reproduced by
for plants); Chen, supra note 7, at 121-40 (discussing the Plant Variety Protection Act); Endres, supra
note 27, at 329-32 (discussing historical intellectual property protection);Janis & Kesan, supra note
7, at 745-53 (discussing the Plant Variety Protection Act); Kesan, supra note 7, at 492-99 (outlining
utility patent intellectual property protection for plants, in general); Michael T. Roberts, National
Aglaw CenterResearcbArtick, J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.: Its Meaning
and Significance for the Agricultural Communioy, 28 S. ILL. U. L.J. 91, 121-24 (2003) (discussing utility
patent protection for genetically engineered plants).
12 Endres, supra note 27, at 326.
53 Id
54 Id.
" Aoki, supra note 29, at 265-67.
56 Id at 266.
5 Endres, supra note 27, at 328.
58 Brown-bag seed sales are another name for saved seeds resold in the secondary market. See
id. at 330.
" Id. at 329.
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seed.6° The Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) granted seed breeders exclusive
rights to commercialize new6' seed varieties.62 As originally passed, the PVPA
allowed farmers to save harvested seed and either sell or trade it to third parties.63
The 1994 amendments to the PVPA eliminated the statutory right of farmers to
sell saved seed protected by a Plant Variety Protection Certificate.64 Farmers,
however, could still save the seed for planting on their own farm.6"
Utility patents offered agro-biotech firms an even stronger form of intellectual
property protection to combat leakages on investment returns. In Diamond v.
Chakrabary,66 the Supreme Court opened the door to utility patents for living
inventions. The Court found the genetically engineered bacteria at issue in
Chakrabarly to be "the result of human ingenuity and research" rather than a mere
discovery of nature's handiwork.6" As an invention made by man, the bacteria
comprised a manufacture or composition of matter under § 101 of the Patent
Act.6" In J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.,69 the Court
applied the same logic as Chakrabar0y and held that subject matter available for
utility patent protection extended to genetically engineered plants.7" Utility
patents, when combined with license agreements at the individual farmer level,
discussed below,7 effectively foreclosed legal seed saving in the United States.
In addition to statutory regimes, a rich history of common law intellectual
property protection, including the protection of trade secrets72 and trademarks,"
o Id. at 330.
61 In addition to being "new," the seed breeder must establish that the variety also is distinct,
uniform, and stable before a plant variety protection certificate will issue. Id. at 329 n.44 (citing 7
U.S.C. § 2402(a) (2000)).
62 7 U.S.C. § 2541 (2000).
63 Endres, supra note 27, at 330.
64 Id.
65 id.
66 447 U.S. 303, 311-12 (1980) (noting that patent claims directed to live organisms were not
outside the scope of patentable material).
67 Id. at 313.
68 Id. at 309-10 ("His claim is not to a hitherto unknown natural phenomenon, but to a
nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter--a product of human ingenuity 'having
a distinctive name, character [and] use.' ") (citation omitted).
69 J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001).
70 Id. at 142-43. See also Roberts, supra note 51, at 104-05 (discussing the majority opinion in
J.E.M. AgSupp#). An example of the ubiquitous nature of utility patents in the current agro-biotech
field is Monsanto's Roundup Ready ® soybeans, which incorporate eight separate patents. See
MONSANTO Co., 2006 TECHNOLOGY/STEWARDSHIP AGREEMENT 1, http://www.farmsource.
com/irnages/pdf/2006%/o20EMTA%2ORev3.pdf#search=%/o22monsanto%20technology/o2ste
wardship%20agreement/o22 (on file with authors).
71 See infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
72 In addition to common law, trade secrets are now "a matter of international law, through
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applies to agricultural seed production.74 Most state trade secret laws protect
information that (1) has an independent economic value as a result of it not being
generally known and not readily ascertainable by proper means and (2) is subject
to reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.7 ' Like the formula and process for
manufacturing Coca-Cola, hybrid corn seed is an excellent candidate for trade
secret protection.76 Hybrid corn seed is the result of the cross-pollination of
pollen from two parent seeds resulting in a "hybrid" with enhanced
chara~teristics.7 7 Examination of the hybrid offspring does not reveal the genetic
composition of the two parent seed lines.78 Moreover, because the hybrid does
not reproduce true-to-type, the same cross-pollination of the two parents must
be performed each time to produce the hybrid variety.79 As a result, hybrid corn
seed breeders are able to keep the genetic composition of the parent lines secret
when marketing their distinct hybrid seeds."0
B. THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
A strong institutional environment serves to uphold and enforce the private
intellectual property rights conferred via the various statutes and common law
doctrines discussed above. In recent years, much attention has focused on court
cases alleging infringement of utility patents owned by the Monsanto Company
for Roundup Ready® soybeans."1 A study of private party enforcement data
compiled from PACER found an average of over twelve lawsuits filed each year
from 1998 through 2004.2 When presented with these disputes, courts at the trial
Article 39 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).';
Mark D. Janis, Suppkmental Forms of Intelkctual Propert Protection for Plants, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
305, 306 (2004).
13 See id at 313-19 (discussing role or trademarks, in conjunction with designations under the
Federal Seed Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1551-1611 (2000), as a means for protecting goodwill associated with
seeds).
71 See, e.g., Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc. v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226 (8th Cir.
1994).
75 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1.
76 PioneerHi-Bredlnt', Inc. v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226 (8th Cir. 1994), is the leading
case regarding trade secret protection for plants. See Janis, supra 72, at 305-13 (discussing trade
secret protection for plant germplasm).
77 Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc. v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., No. 81-60-E, 1987 WL 341211, at
*46 n.5 (S.D. Iowa Oct. 30, 1987).
18 Id. at *2-3.
79 Id.
80 Id.
s See, e.g., Aoki, supra note 29, at 255 (discussing seed saving and utility patent litigation).
82 In a separate study, the Center for Food Safety identified ninety lawsuits filed by Monsanto
for seed saving. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, MONSANTO V. U.S. FARMERS 31 (2005). On average,
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and appellate level have uniformly upheld utility patent rights conferred to the
seed developer and aw~rded significant damages for the infringement. 3 The
average judgment totaled $2.1 million and ranged from $16,874 to $14.5 million.'
The act of filing a lawsuit and proceeding to final judgment, however, is a
measure of last resort. Most allegations of seed saving in the United States are
resolved before filing a complaint in court, and most complaints are settled before
trial or summary judgment. For example, Monsanto reported that from
November 2004 through June 2005 it opened 191 new seed saving
investigations, 85 and on average investigates approximately 500 farmers annually.8 6
Of those investigations resulting in lawsuits, pre-judgment settlements ranged
from $390 to $3 million, with an average settlement value of $88,808.87
In addition to utility patent and plant variety protection certificate rights,
contracts, in the form of technology use agreements, play an important role in
protecting intellectual property in the United States. Each sale of genetically
engineered seed typically requires execution of an accompanying technology use
agreement by the purchaser.88 This "seed contract" restricts the purchaser's use
of the seed with the embedded technology to a single growing season and
prohibits saving any crop for future planting.89 A measure of the institutional
environment within the United States with respect to intellectual property,
Monsanto investigates approximately 500 farmers each year for seed saving. Id. at 24.
" See Donald L. Uchtmann, Can Farmers Save Roundup Read ® Beans for Seed? McFarling and
Trantham Cases Say ''o ", 19 AGRIC. L. UPDATE, Oct. 2002, at 4 (describing two cases upholding
intellectual property rights).
4 See Peter D. Goldsmith & A. Bryan Endres, Soybean Intellectual Property and R&D Incentives:
Strategic Implications and Prescription for a Post-Modem Agriculture, Presentation to the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago, Ag Biotech and Midwest Rural Development (Sept. 8, 2005), presentation slides
availableathttp://www.chicagofed.org/news and-conferences/conferences-and-events/files/2005
_ag-goldsmith.pdf. Recovery of attorneys' fees and costs may also be included in these judgment
amounts. Id.
85 MONSANTO CO., SEED PIRACY UPDATE (2005) (on file with author). On average, Monsanto
investigates approximately 500 farmers each year for seed saving.
8 CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY, supra note 82, at 24 (citing Chris Clayton, Suspicous Soybeans:
Bean Detectives Visit Nebraskan, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Nov. 7, 2004, at 1ID).
" See Goldsmith & Endres, supra note 84. This data, collected from PACER, did not include
settlement amounts from several cases in which the amount was not disclosed in public court
documents.
88 See MONSANTO Co., 2006 TECHNOLOGY USE GUIDE 2, available at http://www.monsanto.
com/monsanto/usag/content/stewardship/tug/2006TUGPDF.pdf (on file with the authors).
'9 See MONSANTO Co., supra note 70, at 2 ("GROWER AGREES... [t]o use Seed containing
Monsanto Technologies solely for planting a single commercial crop. Not to save any crop
produced from Seed for planting and not to supply Seed produced from Seed to anyone for planting
other than to a Monsanto licensed seed company.").
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therefore, must account for these additional restrictions placed on use of the
technology via contracts.
Not surprisingly, courts have enforced these contractual limitations as well.90
In Monsanto Co. v. McFaring (McFarling ),91 the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit upheld express conditions in a technology use agreement that prevented
seed saving. Specifically, the court held that the general rules of patent exhaustion
did not apply because the technology use agreement conferred a limited license
to use the product rather than outright sale.92 In Monsanto v. Scruggs,93 the Federal
Circuit expanded upon the McFarling precedent and held that Monsanto's policy
of prohibiting the replanting of saved seed is "a valid exercise of its rights under
the patent laws" and not in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.94
In sum, a wide range of intellectual property protection exists for agro-biotech
firms operating in the United States. Moreover, an active and stable judiciary has
consistently ruled in favor of these intellectual property rights when asserted
against farmers caught saving seed. Although these lawsuits are evidence of a
breakdown in the social contract (i.e., farmers breaking contracts in which they
covenant not to save seed), when considered in light of the immense scale of
genetically engineered plantings in the United States,9" the breakdown is minor,
isolated, and demonstrates that the broader social contract between buyer and
seller in the agricultural input market remains in effect.
C. PLANT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN ARGENTINA
In contrast to the United States, Argentina's legal framework for protecting
the intellectual property interests of the agro-biotech company is "far from...
9 See general# Janis, supra note 72, at 333 (concluding, based on the cases to date, that agro-
biotech firms have "considerable latitude to employ contract provisions" to bolster intellectual
property rights).
91 302 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
92 Id. at 1299 ("The original sale of the seeds did not confer a license to construct new seeds,
and since the new, seeds were not sold by the patentee they entailed no principle of patent
exhaustion.'). See aloJ anis, supra note 72, at 327-28 (discussing the holding in McFaring I and patent
exhaustion as a "default" rule subject to modification by contract, rather than an absolute rule);
Endres, supra note 27, at 335-39 (discussing limiting doctrine of patent exhaustion through limited
license agreements).
" Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328 (C.A. Fed. Cit. 2006).
94 Id. at 1340.
9' In 2006, U.S. farmers planted 89% of the soybean acres with genetically engineered varieties.
See USDA/ERS Data Sets: Adoption of Genetically Engineered Crops in the U.S.: Extent of
Adoption, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/BiotechCrops/adopion.htm. None of the farmers were
authorized to plant the crops with saved seeds.
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comprehensive."9 6 The first suigeneris intellectual property protection for seed
breeders operating in Argentina was the 1973 "Law of Seeds. 97 Unfortunately,
implementation of the law did not occur until 1978.98 The Law of Seeds provided
the seed breeder exclusive commercialization rights for a period of years.99
Similar to the Plant Variety Protection Act, the law gave farmers the right to use
saved seeds from a previous harvest and competitors the right to use the seed to
experiment and develop their own new varieties. 1"0
In 1991, the Argentine government created the National Seed Institute
(Instituto Nacional de Semillas, INASE) to improve the enforcement and control
of these property rights. 1 ' Professors Gallo and Kesan, however, citing a U.S.
General Accounting Office report, found the Law of Seeds ineffective in reducing
theft of plant-based intellectual property.' In 1996, INASE attempted to
minimize seed saving abuses by requiring the farmer desiring to save seed to
prove that the foundation seed was originally purchased legally, that the saved
seed was harvested from the legally purchased seed, that the saved seed was
segregated from the other seed, and that transfer or sale of the saved seed had not
occurred. 3 The Secretary ofAgriculture, however, due to economic crisis, closed
INASE in 2000, thereby abandoning governmental oversight of plant intellectual
property rights."° The government reopened INASE in 2004105 and implemented
a resolution requiring each sack of seed offered for sale to "be labeled with
quantity, unit price, total sales price, and seed species, type or variety."106
As discussed above, Plant Variety Protection-based intellectual property
prova i y 1n Of the possible intellectual property options in the United
States. Seed breeders desiring additional protection may also apply for utility
patents. Like many countries, however, Argentina's patent laws specifically
exclude plants from eligibility for utility patents.'0 7 Although subsequent
96 Gallo & Kesan, supra note 48, at 581.
9 Id. at 582.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. The Plant Variety Protection Act recognizes farmer's rights to save seed at 7 U.S.C. §
2543 (2000) and the research exemption at 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (2000).
'0' Gallo & Kesan, supra note 48, at 585-86.
112 Id. at 586 (citing U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BIOTECHNOLOGY: INFORMATION
ON PRICES OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED SEEDS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ARGENTINA 15-16
(2000)).
"' Id. at 587 (citing Secretaria de Agricultura Ganaderia y Pesca, Resolucion INASE No. 35/96,
art. 1), availabeathttp://www.upov.int/en/publications/npvlaws/argentina/farmersprivilege.pdo.
104 Gallo & Kesan, supra note 48, at 588.
105 Id.
" Yankelevich, supra note 44, at 10.
107 Gallo & Kesan, supra note 48, at 594. See also Averie K. Hason & Jean E. Shimotake, Recent
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amendments to the Argentine patent laws may open the door to utility patents for
plants, there is considerable uncertainty over the state of the law.'
0 8
In addition to relatively weak statutory intellectual property rights, the
institutional environment (i.e., governmental enforcement of rights) falls below
the standards found in the United States. The USDA's Foreign Agricultural
Service (FAS) characterized the "[p]enalties for unauthorized use of protected
seed varieties" as "neglgible."'1 9  Moreover, the FAS found the judicial
enforcement procedures available to prevent the unauthorized use of seed
varieties protected by the Law of Seeds ineffective." ° As a result of this weak
institutional environment, the seed sales prohibitions introduced in 2004"'. failed
to halt the unauthorized sale of saved seed," 2 and, from the perspective of the
agro-biotech firm, renders the intellectual property system inadequate." 3
IV. THE THEORY OF THE DYNAMIC GAMING MODEL
Underlying the seed company's problem of leakages in return on investment
is a fundamental principal-agent (P-A) relationship between farmers and the seed
development firm." 4 In typical P-A relationships, the principal relies on the
agent's effort, but may lack full information regarding the efforts or actions
necessary to incentivize the agent." 5 In the case of the seed industry, farmers (the
Developments in Patent Rightsfor Pharmaceuticals in China and India, 18 PACE INT'L L. REv. 303, 305-06
(2006) (noting that China's patent laws specifically exclude animals and plants); Franz-Josef Simmer
& Svenja Sethmann, Act Implementing the Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions in
Germany (BIOPATG), 24 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 561, 563 (2005) (detailing amendment to
German patent laws to exclude plants and animals unless the technical feasibility of the invention
is not confined to a particular plant or animal variety).
108 Gallo & Kesan, supra note 48, at 594.
109 Yankelevich, supra note 44, at 9.
110 Id.
l Id. at 10 (discussing Resolution 44/2004 that required labels for each sack of seeds).
112 Id. (discussing continuation of illegal seed sales).
113 Id.
114 S. Umeno, Economics of the Farmer-Saved-Seed A Challengefor the Enforcement oflntellectual Property
Rights in Agriculture (2006) (Unpublished manuscript on file with the authors); Peter D. Goldsmith
et al., Intellectual Propert and the Seed Breeder's Problem (2006) (Working Paper, The Department of
Agricultural and Consumer Economics, University of Illinois) (on file with authors).
11 JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT &JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN PROCUREMENT
AND REGULATION 82-84 (1993) (documenting optional contract arrangements for P-A relationships
in the presence of asymmetric information and the challenge of determining the appropriate
incentive to induce desired behavior); Peter D. Goldsmith & Rishi Basak, Incentive Contracts and
Environmental Performance Indicators, 20 ENVTL. & RES. ECON. 259, 261-62 (2001) (discussing P-A
relationships in the context of environmental monitoring systems); Henrik Vetter & Kostas
Karantininis, Moral Hazard, Vertical Integration, and Public Monitoring in Credence Goods, 29 EUR. REV.
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agents) have an information advantage over the seed developer (the principal)
because it is costly to determine whether the second generation crop was grown
from purchased or illegally saved seed. Farmers, on the other hand, know their
own risk preferences and costs for saving seed," 6 which may translate into their
willingness to circumvent intellectual property rules or breach contractual
agreements.
A. MONITORING STRATEGY TO REDUCE INFORMATION ASYMMETRY
A principal may reduce the level of asymmetric information via costly
monitoring activities to alter the probabilities of apprehension and increase the
costs to agents of deviating from the contract or infringing intellectual property
rights."' Sophisticated monitoring approaches, such as random or stratified
targeting,"' may affect significantly the likelihood of apprehension and reduce the
overall cost of monitoring."
9
A real-world example of monitoring within the context of the seed industry
is the well-publicized effort of industry-leader Monsanto to monitor and
aggressively prosecute unauthorized seed saving in the domestic market. 120 As
noted in Part III.B, above, Monsanto actively investigates allegations of seed
saving to protect its intellectual property.' The Center for Food Safety reported
that Monsanto employs seventy-five individuals and budgets $10 million annually
to investigate and prosecute seed saving.'2 In addition, Monsanto solicits
individuals to confidentially report suspected seed saving via a toll-free number
or letter.13 In addition to securing monetary awards for infringement of its
AGRIC. EcON. 271, 271-72 (2002) (discussing moral hazard and P-A relationships in the food
production context).
16 Costs for saving seed may include cleaning and conditioning costs, as well as costs of storage
in appropriate climatic conditions to ensure germination the following season. Jan Spears & Randy
Weisz, Planting FarmerSaved Wheat Seed'Are You Real SangMony?, in SMALL GRAINS PRODUCTION
GUIDE (2004-2005), available at http://www.smaUgrains.ncsu.edu/Guide/Chapter4.html.
17 Goldsmith et al., supra note 114, at 27.
"8 See Mark A. Cohen, E pirical Research on the Deterrent Effect of Environmental Monitoring and
Enforcement, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10245, 10247-48 (2000) (discussing effectiveness of alternative
monitoring strategies).
19 Goldsmith et al., supra note 114, at 27.
120 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (discussing the amounts of Monsanto's seed
saving investigations).
121 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (discussing the amount of Monsanto's seed
saving investigations).
122 CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, supra note 82, at 23.
123 MONSANTO Co., 2006 MONSANTO TECHNOLOGY USE GUIDE, supra note 88, at 1.
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intellectual property, these well-publicized legal actions undoubtedly serve as a
deterrent and may reduce the overall cost of monitoring for the firm.
In sum, private sector monitoring plays an important role in reducing
information asymmetry inherent in the principal-agent relationship characterizing
the market for genetically engineered seed.
B. RISK AVERSION IN THE AGRICULTURAL CONTEXT
Standard tort theory posits that punishment, in the form of damages, will deter
bad conduct.'24 Punishment, however, requires detection and identification of the
wrongdoer and successful enforcement of any subsequent judgment.
Accordingly, a potential tortfeasor contemplating a wrongful act will consider the
probability of apprehension and likelihood of enforcement as components of the
damages (potential loss) function. In the agricultural context, farmers, as rational
economic actors, will refrain from saving seeds only if their possible losses from
getting caught exceed the benefits of lowering their production costs from using
saved seed. 2 ' The institutional environment (i.e., ability to enforce legal rights),
therefore, is an important factor for the farmer considering saving seeds.26 and a
critical component to disincentivize inappropriate action.127 Farmers will adjust
their risk-taking behaviors to coincide with different enforceable standards.
Adjustments in behavior at the farmer (agent) level depend upon the
underlying tolerance for risk. "[T]he level of perceived risk, shaped by the
severity of the consequences and the probability of occurrence, determines both
the contractual terms and the nature of incentives designed to induce the agent's
cooperation. ,12' The effectiveness of an enforcement strategy for seed saving in
a given institutional environment, therefore, is determined in part by the degree
of the farmers' risk aversion and the cost structure of monitoring compliance.
29
124 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(c) (1979).
125 Stated another way, "[a farmer] will [only] commit the act [of saving seed] if and only if his
expected utility from doing so, taking into account his gain and the chance of his being caught and
sanctioned, exceeds his utility ifhe does not [save seed]." A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The
Economic Theory of Pubic Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 47 (2000).
126 See id. at 64 (noting that an increase in the expected penalty reduces the level of violation of
agents).
127 See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of
Behavior, 102J. POL. ECON. 583,601-02 (1994) (discussing optimal strategies ofenforcement to deter
undesired conduct); Arun S. Malik, Seff-Reporting andthe Design ofPo'desfor Regulating Stochastic Pollution,
24 J. ENVTL. EcON. & MGMT. 241, 242 (1993) (discussing institutional environments and self
reporting).
i Goldsmith et al., supra note 114, at 8.
'2 Adam Ozanne et al-., MoralHazard RiskAversion andCompianceMonitoringinAgti-Envirnmental
Pohfy, 28 EUR. REV. AGRIC. ECON. 329, 330 (2001).
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A higher degree of risk aversion allows convergence of the second-best outcome
with the first-best solution.
30
Conventional assumptions that a principal is risk neutral while an agent is risk-
averse 3' hold true in the agricultural context. Numerous commentators have
found farmers, as a whole, to exhibit risk-averse behavior.' 32 Faced with uncertain
weather conditions and generally tight budget constraints, farmers demonstrate
this risk-averse behavior by minimizing their chances of falling below some
subsistence minimum, even if this means sacrificing some income on the
average.' 3 3 Large-scale farmers, however, may be less risk-averse because they can
diversify more easily than smaller farmers."3 Accordingly, under a base setup, the
relatively risk-averse (smaller) farmer would save less seed than the more risk-
neutral (larger) farmer, and be willing to give up some profit in exchange for a
more stable income.
35
The implication from this conclusion in the seed market is troubling to the
agro-biotech firm contemplating expansion into weak institutional regions. Seed
companies have an incentive to deal with customers sensitive to risk (small
farmers), but their best customers-the ones who purchase the most seed and
generate economies of scale for the seed company-may, ceterisparibus, be less
sensitive to risk and, therefore, more inclined to save seed. Two important
questions arise: (1) How does a seed company elicit risk-averse behavior within
weak institutional environments and (2) how does the firm achieve this behavioral
30 Goldsmith et al., supra note 114, at 17-18 (modeling dynamics of saving seed).
131 See LAFFONT & TIROLE, supra note 115, at 82;Jean-Paul Chavas & Matthew T. Holt, Acreage
Decisions UnderRisk. The Case of Corn andSqybeans, 72 AM.J. AGRIC. ECON. 529,535 (1990) (modeling
risk-responsive acreage decisions); Joseph Henrich & Richard Mcelreath, Are Peasants Risk-Averse
Decision Makers?, 43 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 172, 172 (2002) (finding peasants risk-averse
because of their uncertain and precarious economic situation).
132 PETER B.R. HAZELL & ROGER D. NORTON, MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING FOR
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN AGRICULTURE 77 (MacMillan 1986) (finding agents generally risk averse);
Jean-Paul Chavas & Matthew T. Holt, Economic Behavior Under Uncertaino: A Joint Ana~sis of Riask
Preferences and Technology, 78 REV. ECON. & STAT. 329, 335 (1996) (finding "decreasing absolute risk
aversion and downside risk aversion").
133 See HAZELL& NORTON, supra note 132, at 94 (examining the maxi-min strategy arising from
farmers' pessimistic view of their reliance on nature and selection of a maximum outcome under the
worst possible state of nature); Bruce Winterhalder et al., Risk-Sensitive Adaptive Tactics: Models and
Evidencefrom Subsistence Studies in Biology andAnthropology, 7 J. ARCHAEOLOGICAL REs. 301,334 (1999)
(discussing risk mitigation strategies by early Native American subsistence farmers).
134 Goldsmith et al., supra note 114, at 16 (citing Working Party on Agricultural Policies &
Markets, OECD, Risk Related Non-Price Effects of the Cap Arable Crop Regime: Results from an
FADN Sample 10 (2003), availableathttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/30/25314276.pdf("[S]mall
farms... [are] the most risk averse,.. . while the degree or (relative) risk aversion decreases with
size.., and for large farms it becomes virtually [risk neutral] .... )).
"' See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text (describing risk aversion in relation to scale).
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shift among its larger and more profitable customers? The answer lies, in part,
on pricing strategy and monitoring efforts to maximize profits under sub-optimal
institutional environments.
C. PRICING STRATEGY FOR SEEDS SUSCEPTIBLE TO SAVING
Goldsmith et al. developed a theoretical game model for an optimal seed
contract 36 (limited license agreement) involving a two-period game between a
seed firm (principal) and a farmer (agent). 37 In modeling seed saving, the farmer
confronts a variety of risks: seed quality," 8 yield drag, 39 and, as noted above,
potential penalties for using seed for a second harvest without authorization. In
addition, feedback in period two regarding the probability of apprehension factors
into the degree of risk felt by the farmer. Ceterisparibus, lowering the price of
seed, higher seed saving costs, increasing penalties for seed saving, increasing the
probability of apprehension, and high yield drag discouraged farmers from saving
seeds."4 In the baseline case, with a strong intellectual property environment, the
agro-biotech firm would set a seed price such that farmers receive their
reservation utilities and the firm recoups its research and development costs for
genetically engineering and producing the seed. In addition, the firm could forgo
136 See smpra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (describing typical provisions of seed contracts).
137 Goldsmith et al., supra note 114, at 10-22 (describing theoretical framework of the model).
"3 Seed quality is a broad term that reflects both the homogeneity of the seed product and the
likelihood the seed performs as expected. P. McMahon et al., Fruit and Seed Quality, at
http://quorumsensing.ifas.ufl. edu/HCS200/SeedLab.html. Homogeneity can be compromised by
the inclusion in the seed bag of: weed seed, non-seed foreign matter (e.g., stems or dirt), other seed
cultivars (e.g., corn seed in a soybean seed bag), other seed varieties, and microscopic materials (e.g.,
fungi). Seed performance, such as low germination rates, can be adversely affected by the inclusion
of cracked or damaged seeds, poor initial selection processes, and non-optimal moisture levels. In
the United States, the Federal Seed Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1551-1611, regulates, at least minimally, some
aspects of seed quality. For a more complete discussion of the Federal Seed Act and quality, with
respect to genetically engineered seed, see A. Bryan Endres, Revising SeedPurity Laws toAccountfor the
Adventitious Presence of Geneical#y Modified Varieties: A First Step Towards Coexistence, 1 J. FOOD L. &
POL'Y 131,156-59 (2005).
139 Yield drag, in general, occurs when an agricultural practice is performed on a crop that results
in a decrease in yield. Karen Coaldrake, Trait Enthusiasm Does Not Guarantee On-Farm Profits, 2
AGBIOFORUM, 118,124 (1999), availableathttp://www.agbioforum.org/v2n2/v2n2aO9-coaldrake.
htm (discussing potential causes of yield drag). When farmers save seed they engage in a practice
that substitutes the last (inferior) generation of seed for the current (superior) generation. They
accept the slightly lower yield of the last generation because they lower their costs of production by
not purchasing seed. Engaging in the same practice with hybrid seed corn incurs a yield drag far in
excess of the cost benefits of avoiding corn seed purchases. Thus the practice of hybrid corn seed
saving does not occur.
14 Goldsmith et al., supra note 114, at 33.
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monitoring efforts because of a robust institutional environment backed by strong
individual adherence to a social contract that respects intellectual property rights.
Moreover, farmers operating in this robust legal environment may continue to
purchase seeds the second year, even if prices rise, because of their concern for
apprehension and imposition of penalties. In this case, the monopolist seed
company can capture economic rents in the second period.
The role of risk, however, also plays an important part in pricing strategy. In
a robust institutional environment (characterized by strong intellectual property
laws and an efficient court system to impose penalties), only the risk-neutral
farmer would save seeds. In a weak institutional environment, however, the
probability of being caught and having a penalty enforced dramatically decreases.
The behavior of the risk-neutral farmer would not change, but farmers with risk-
averse preferences will now save more seed, forcing the seed company to lower
prices to attract more buyers and lower the marginal benefit of saving seed. Seed
companies, therefore, in choosing an appropriate price strategy, need accurate
information about the farmer's production characteristics and risk preference.
A quick comparison between the experiences in the United States and
Argentina illustrates this point. In the United States, less than 8% of soybean
seed is thought to be saved seed, while in Argentina, informal marketing, either
using on-farm saved seed or purchasing seed saved by a neighbor rather than a
seed company, dominates up to 90% of the market."' One could presume that
the price of seed would be lower in the United States than Argentina to induce
such a high level of annual purchasing. Likewise, one would predict that
commercial seed prices in Argentina were high and, therefore, encouraged seed
saving. The actual commercial price in the United States, however, was $17/fifty
lbs from 1998-2000, while in Argentina, the soybean seed price was only $11, $8
and $7/fifty lbs in the respective years, resulting in an average price differential
between the countries of 49%. Moreover, any effort to raise prices in Argentina
is likely to be met by an increase in the rate of saved seeds, resulting in offsetting
revenue losses.143 In contrast, the price for corn seed in Argentina averaged 93%
of the U.S. price. 144  The difference between the two seeds--corn and
soy-appears to be the natural resistance to saving seed as a result of
hybridization. Absent the natural barrier to duplication provided by
141 Peter Goldsmith et al., A Tale of Two Businesses: Intellectual Propertv Rights and the Marketing of
Agricultural Biotechnologv, CHOICES, Aug. 2003, at 25, 26.
142 See U.S. GENERALACCOUNTING OFFICE, BIOTECHNOLOGY: INFORMATION ON PRICES OF
GENETICALLYMODIFIED SEEDS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ARGENTINA 17-18 (2000); E. Accari,
Agentina Planting Seeds Annual, USDA/FAS Gain Report (2000); USDA, Nat'l Agric. Stat. Serv.,
Agricultural Prices (2001).
143 Goldsmith et al., supra note 9, at 341-42 (discussing demand elasticity).
144 Kesan & Gallo, supra note 7, at 121 tbl. 1.
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hybridization, strong intellectual property protection, such as found in the United
States, appears, at first glance, necessary to maintain prices and is the primary
reason for the price differential in soybean seed.
Using a theoretical game model, Goldsmith et al. identified that the
institutional environments in which seed companies operate influence the
behavior of farmers and firms. 14 When intellectual property rights are robust and
enforcement is efficient, no seeds will be saved and seed company profit is
maximized. On the other hand, when institutional structures are low or zero,
ceteris paribus, farmers begin to save seed. This would confirm most
commentators' claims that a strong intellectual property environment is necessary
for profitability." The simulation conducted by Goldsmith et al., however,
demonstrated that a seed company can achieve comparable profits, even in a weak
institutional environment, if the firm adopts a non-monopolistic price strategy.
For example, if the probability of apprehension is low and the farmer is
concerned about total utility over a two-year period, the farmer may be willing to
pay a high price in year one and accept a lower year one utility. In year two,
however, the farmer would save the seed, avoid seed purchase costs, and
experience super-normal utility. This can be thought of as a "pump-priming"
scenario whereby the monopolist seed seller and the farmer-buyer know that
monopoly power is sustainable for only a single period.'47 The seller would
maximize price in year one and forego profits in year two. 4 The buyer would
accept a lower utility in year one because he knows that yield drag would be
minimal in year two and he could exploit the technology by saving the seed not
only in year two, but possibly beyond. 49 In a separate study, Goldsmith et al.
145 Goldsmith et al., supra note 114, at 14--15.
146 Kesan & Gallo, supra note 7, at 121.
147 A similar process occurs in the metal industry. For example, in the landmark antitrust case,
United States v. Aluminum Co. ofAmerica, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cit. 1945), defendant Alcoa attempted to
refute antitrust allegations by arguing that it lacked control of the secondary market. Id. at 424.
Once Alcoa released its "virgin" aluminum ingots to the market, scrap dealers could manufacture
"secondary" aluminum ingots that, although not competing in all uses, for most purposes were
substantially equivalent with "virgin" ingots. Id. at 424. Accordingly, the court found that "at any
given moment... 'secondary' competes with 'virgin' in the ingot market.., and probably... set[s]
a limit or 'ceiling' beyond which the price of 'virgin' cannot go, for the cost of [secondary ingot's]
production will in the end depend only upon the expense of scavenging and reconditioning." Id.
In the seed market, there is a ceiling as well. The cost of second year (saved) seed only involves the
expense of cleaning, conditioning and storing for the following growing season.
148 See DENNIS W. CARLTON &JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
637 (citing Darius W. Gaskins,Jr., Alcoa Revisited" The Welfare Impfications of a Secondhand Market, 7 J.
OF EcON. THEORY 357-59 (1974) for an explanation as to why the first-period price is higher than
the short-run monopoly price because higher production and lower costs in the short run would lead
to a larger stock of aluminum scrap and more competition from the secondary market).
149 Goldsmith et al., supra note 114, at 26.
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found empirical evidence of this in the Argentinean seed market where
commercial soybean seed prices actually rose over time in response to aggressive
seed saving and brown-bag sales as the commercial sellers realized that their seed
served only as foundation seed to prime the pump of the extensive brown-bag
industry.'
50
Although theoretically possible, the feasibility of a pump-priming pricing
strategy ultimately depends upon the underlying research and development costs
of the firm, farmers' utility perspectives, and the availability of credit for the
farmer. 151 If the initial price is too high, farmer's utility in year one would decline
below a point where the increased utility in year two would not achieve the
150 Goldsmith et al., supra note 9, at 346.
A complete discussion of credit availability is beyond the scope of this Article but warrants
mentioning in some detail. In Argentina, traditional cash credit is not available to farmers. Interview
by Peter D. Goldsmith with Alejandro Muiloz, CEO, Pioneer Argentina S.A., in Buenos Aires, Arg.
(May 2001). Rather, a quasi-barter system exists in which input suppliers (including land owners)
agree to delayed payment for a set quantity of the expected harvest. Id. This "bag of beans" credit
system transfers some of the price risk to the input suppliers (i.e., the price of beans drops on the
commodity markets below the price/quantity of beans agreed upon at the time the supplier entered
into the bargain). Id. The importance of a stable and enforceable credit system in the agricultural
context recently played out via the introduction of genetically engineered cotton in the Makhathini
Flats reinnn ofn oth Africa. M rus Got, se et al., BtCoion In i,,Zt/, Ntalb : T.hnon/no, T.-.'-h b
But Institutional Failure, AGBIOTECHNET, Mar. 2005, 1, 1-7. In 1998, a group of farmers in the
Makhathini Flats region experimented with cultivation of genetically engineered (Bt) cotton. Id at
1. After widespread reporting of large yield increases and reduced labor input, demand for the seeds
skyrocketed. Id at 1-2. The South African government-funded Land Bank extended credit for the
seeds with collateral in the forthcoming crops. Id. at 7. An estimated 90% of the regions' farmers
adopted the technology. Elfrieda Pschom-Strauss, Bt Cotton in SouthAfnca: The Case ofthe Makhathini
Farmers, SEEDLING, Apr. 2005, at 13-24. A single cotton gin, Vunsia Cotton, existed in the area and
would withhold a portion of the farmers' harvest proceeds for repayment of the Land Bank loans.
Gouse et al., supra, at 2. A devastating flood in 2000 followed by two successive seasons of drought
and plummeting cotton prices left many farmers with low yields and mounting debt. Pschom-
Strause, supra, at 16, 17 tbl. 1. The appearance of the new Makhathini Cotton Company cotton gin
(funded by Danish donors and local government) provided farmers with another outlet for their
crops. Ida at 20-21. The new cotton ginning company did not automatically withhold loan payments
for Land Bank and an estimated 80% of the farmers defaulted on their loans. Id. at 21. Vunisa
Cotton folded, the Land Bank ceased direct credit support to the farmers, and the number of
farmers growing Bt cotton decreased by 80%. Id. at 21. The initial technical success of Bt cotton,
followed by a rapid reduction in cotton farming, highlights the importance of a stable credit
extension system in economically disadvantaged farming regions when adopting the more expensive
genetically modified seed varieties. Gouse and others argue that monopsony (only one available
buyer) was appropriate for cotton production in the Makhathini Flats area in order to ensure that
the lender recovered its seed loans. Gouse et al., supra, at 7. The introduction of a second gin
provides a route for default, which is followed by future lack of credit availability and an overall
decline in production. Id.
28
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol14/iss2/2
2007] AGRO-BIOTECHNOLOGY BUSINESS STRATEGIES 265
farmer's reservation utility." 2 However, if the yield drag from saved seed remains
at only 1% to 2% and yearly innovation levels are moderate, farmers could use the
saved seed over a longer time period, say three to four years, before returning for
fresh commercial seed. This long-term view of utility could justify, from the
farmer's perspective, a higher price in year one.
On the other hand, an active innovation strategy, whereby seed genetics were
outdated after two years, might reestablish the firm's monopolist position by
increasing yield drag and significantly changing the seed saving calculus such that
farmers would prefer to purchase new seed in year two. Rapid innovation thus
serves as an alternative to the pump-priming strategy. The challenge though is
that rapid innovation may require extensive investment, and may be either
technically infeasible or costly. Examples where rapid innovation strategy
successfully maintains a firm's pricing power monopoly can be seen in the fashion
and consumer products industries.
D. NON-PRICE RELATED STRATEGIC OPTIONS FOR THE FIRM
In addition to the dynamic pricing options identified by the model, other non-
price related strategic options may be available for the firm. A brief discussion
of these alternatives follows.
1. Product Bundling. Product bundling presents a near-term, non-price strategy
for the agro-biotech firm already offering multiple inputs to the agricultural
system. In the United States, some bundling schemes may implicate antitrust
concerns or the doctrine of patent misuse.'53 For firms operating in areas that
lack both antitrust and intellectual property rules, a product bundling strategy,
however, may be viable." 4
152 In addition, if the farmer's utility is separable such that there is a reservation utility for each
period, the farmer-buyer will not accept high first period pricing (and lower utility) even though he
knows the total utility he can achieve through a two-year period equals or exceeds his reservation
utility.
153 See STEPHEN F. Ross, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 274 (Foundation Press, Inc., 1993)
(noting that § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14, "bars a seller from conditioning the sale of a
good on the purchaser's forbearance from purchasing a competitor's products..."); see aLroJefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (establishing five elements of illegal tying
arrangements). In Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917),
the Supreme Court applied the doctrine of patent misuse to prohibit a similar tying of goods, in this
case the purchase of a patented movie projector (of which there were no substitutes-in the market)
with patented film (substitutes available).
154 The extent to which extraterritorial actions might violate United States antitrust or unfair
competition laws is an interesting issue, but beyond the scope of this Article. See 1 SPENCER WEBER
WALLER, ANTITRUST& AM. Bus. ABROAD § 11:19 (3d ed. 1998) (noting that § 3 of the Clayton Act
does not apply to foreign sales, but that a significant foreclosure of other American firms to foreign
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Two types of product bundling alternatives are available for the agro-biotech
firm attempting to sell self-pollinating seeds. The "mild" version is the loss leader
strategy. Seed companies often are part of larger "life science" firms that offer
a full range of agricultural inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides, a variety of seed
species (e.g., corn, soybean, cotton) and advice regarding the optimal use of these
products (e.g., soil samples or consulting). The firm adopting a loss leader
strategy could "give away" self-pollinating soybean seed in order to attract
customers to its single use products such as corn seed and the necessary agro-
chemicals. Of course, this strategy is effective only to the extent that the firm has
other goods desired by customers. The alternative bundling option is to play
"hard ball" and refuse outright to sell improved varieties of hybrid corn seed or
chemicals unless the farmer also purchases (or pays a royalty) for soybean seed."'5
2. Genetic Use Restriction Technologies. Genetic Use Restriction Technologies
(GURTs) attempt to insert a sterility feature into the plant's genome whereby
second generation seeds will not germinate. Variations of this strategy include
second generation seeds that do not contain the enhanced technology (e.g., saved
Roundup Ready® soybean seeds that no longer tolerate Roundup) or insertion of
"gene keys" whereby the desirable trait is "turned on" via application of a single
use spray (the key). From the agro-biotech firm's perspective, GURTs present
an incredibly efficient method of protecting intellectual property and returns on
investment. Private monitoring and enforcement through the court system would
be superfluous, even in the weakest of institutional environments. But this
..... 1---1-'6gly and ern^: ..... wht sm have "terminator
technology, ' engenders significant controversy and warrants further scholarly
analysis regarding the policy and environmental implications before
commercialization.157 Moreover, securing approval to market seeds containing
GURTs may prove difficult in many regions of the world. As a result, although
the technology is feasible (and in the innovation pipeline) a GURT-oriented
strategy remains a "longer-term" strategy because of social, political and
environmental concerns.
3. Reduce Investment in Perilous Products. When intellectual property is
vulnerable, agro-biotech firms, as a last resort, may employ a reduced investment
strategy or minimal product support as a risk attenuating mechanism. If there is
business opportunities as a result of the tying arrangement could be subject to the Sherman Act).
155 Some domestic firms attempt to bundle sales of seed with chemicals by conditioning any
warranty on the seed with the use of the same firm's agricultural chemicals. For example, in its
technology use agreements from 1996 to 1998, Monsanto required growers to use Monsanto's
Roundup glyphosate herbicide rather than other glyphosate brands on Roundup Ready® plants. See
Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1339 (C.A. Fed. Cir. 2006).
156 See Muscati, stmpra note 49, at 478-81.
157 See id.
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no investment, then any sale of seed, regardless of price, will have a high "return
on investment." Although some argue that farmers will suffer in a strong
intellectual property rights environment because of monopoly pricing by the input
suppliers,' the converse may also hold true. If agro-biotechnology firms adopt
a reduced investment strategy due to a weak environment for intellectual property
rights, farmers also may suffer in the long run due to outdated technology as a
consequence of underinvestment in improving crop varieties."5 9 Furthermore,
this may have ramifications on the supply chain beyond the individual farm
operators. Soybean crushers and processors rely on a river of beans. 6 ° Falling
yields due to outdated technology could shrink the river of beans and cause
disruptions throughout the supply chain.
V. CONCLUSION
Although some may criticize the business environment in the United States as
burdensome and over-regulated, when domestic firms leave these relatively
friendly confines to pursue business opportunities in the developing world, they
often must enter an environment with a different social contact between sellers
and buyers. A firm reliant on Western-based abstractions such as intellectual
property, therefore, must have multiple approaches to profit maximization or they
will quickly find their new operating environment "nasty, brutish and short.'
16 1
When the legal process fails (or is non-existent) and lawyers, as litigators, are
irrelevant, the solutions offered above can make the second best outcome
converge with the optimal alternative (efficient enforcement of intellectual
property rights) to create a beautiful world. In sum, firms must adapt to the
systems into which they venture.
Farmer-saved seed and the associated impact on profitability remains a major
concern for agro-biotech companies investing in genetically engineered seed. The
relative status of the intellectual property right environment is not the only
consideration for recovery of research and development expenditures. Farmer
158 See Andrew T. Mushita & Carol B. Thompson, Patenting Biodiversioy? R;eeing WITO/TRIPS
in SouthernAfn'ca, 2 GLOBAL ENvTL. POL. 65, 71-72 (2002); Keith Aoki, Neocoloniatism, Anicommons
Property, and Biopiray in the (not-so-brave) New World Order of International Intelkctual Propery Protection, 6
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11, 55-56 (1998).
"I9 See Goldsmith & Endres, supra note 84; P.D. Goldsmith et al., Seed Biotecbnology, Intelkctual
Propertj, and GlobalAgiculturalCompetitiveness, in SEEDS OF CHANGE: AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY
IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Jay Kesan ed., Elsivier Press, forthcoming 2006).
"6 Similar arguments have been made with respect to agribusiness giants Cargill and ADM and
their reliance on "a river of corn." MICHAEL POLLAN,THE OMNWORE'S DILEMMA 63,86 (Penguin
Press, 2006).
161 HOBBES, supra note 2, at 89.
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risk preferences, the cost of saving seed, monitoring costs, and farmer size
distribution influence seed company strategies. Farmer-saved seed may not be a
serious problem for the seed company, even in weak intellectual property
environments, if the firm can deploy dynamic pricing, product bundling, or
genetic use restrictions. Moreover, to the extent farmers are willing to consider
satisfying their reservation utility over longer time periods (e.g., two or more
years), a pump-priming pricing strategy may provide seed companies adequate
return on investment if they set a higher price in year one. Product bundling, to
the extent it does not conflict with host country antitrust rules, genetic use
restriction technologies, or, as a last result, reduced research and development
investment, present additional alternatives for the firm.
The implications for this alternative view of strategy are important. Many of
the newly emergent food producing countries either lack strong intellectual
property rights or the institutional environment to enforce these rights against
infringers. In these weak institutional environments, the alternative profit
maximization strategies may counter leakages to return on investment resulting
from saved seed. Moreover, as these regions develop stronger institutional
mechanisms to enforce property rights and farmers adjust their social norms to
recognize these rights, the agro-biotechnology firm can subsequently shift their
strategies back to more legalistic approaches, such as the limited license
agreements used in the United States. Until then, firms must consider alternative
short-run strategies or risk losing out on significant business opportunities in
many rapidly expanding markets.
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